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sons.42 Unfortunately, its holding may prove a source of abuse. Since
many of our cities are faced with critical housing shortages and the
on-going problem of whites fleeing to the suburbs, leaving central cities
to become segregated ghettos, local municipalities are confronted with
the challenge of reversing this trend and thwarting further neighbor-
hood deterioration. An increasing burden will be placed on the courts
to insure that individual rights are not sacrificed to achieve this goal.
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF NEWSMEN PROTECTED
Baker v. F. & F. Investment
The extent of a news reporter's right to refuse to reveal a confi-
dential news source has been the subject of much recent discussion and
judicial consideration. In the much publicized case of Branzburg v.
Hayes1 the Supreme Court ruled that the constitutional protections of
the first amendment cannot be invoked by a newsman seeking to pro-
tect his confidential source from the inquiry of a grand jury.2 The
rationale in Branzburg was that the public's interest in having the
grand jury receive everyman's evidence outweighs the newsman's right
to withhold his confidential source.8 Thus, absent an effective statutory
42 A decision for the plaintiffs would have invalidated 171 leases, whereas a reversal
may mean the judicially-sanctioned breach of a lawful promise made to some 322 tenants.
1408 U.S. 665 (1972).
2 The three cases consolidated for argument in Branzburg are summarized as follows:
(1) Branzburg v. Hayes, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970): Paul Branzburg,
an investigative reporter for the Louisville (Ky.) Courier-Journal was sub-
poenaed before a grand jury, but refused to reveal the identity of his con-
fidential sources who had supplied information about local drug abuse
practices. The Kentucky High Court declined to quash the subpoenas; the
Supreme Court affirmed.
(2) Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970): Earl Caldwell, a
New York Times reporter, brought an action to quash subpoenas ordering
him to appear and testify before a grand jury investigating local activities
of the Black Panther Party. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
quashed the subpoenas; the Supreme Court reversed.
(3) In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971): Paul Pappas, a reporter
for WTEV-TV (New Bedford, Mass.), appeared before a grand jury, but
refused to answer questions concerning his attendance at a local Black
Panther Party meeting. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts de-
dined to quash the subpoena and ruled: "We adhere to the view that there
exists no constitutional newsmen's privilege either qualified or absolute, to
refuse to appear and testify before a court or grand jury." 266 N.E.2d at
302-33. The Supreme Court refused to disturb the holding.
8 This broad statement, however, belied the reasoning used in Branzburg. Mr. Justice
Powell, whose concurring opinion represented the crucial swing vote, wrote, in the
strongest terms, that the balancing test approach has not lost its vitality:
[I]f the newsman is called upon to give information bearing only a remote and
tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if he has some other
reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source relationships
without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the Court on
a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered. The
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shield,4 a newsman would be required to comply with a grand jury re-
quest for the identity of his confidential source.
Great concern over the chilling effect on investigative reporting
asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the striking of a
proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens
to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of these
vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the
tried and traditional way of adjudicating such questions.
In short, the courts will be available to newsmen under circumstances where
legitimate First Amendment interests require protection.
408 U.S. at 710.
Indeed, it was a Branzburg-type balancing test that was utilized by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals when it determined that a claim of absolute executive
privilege by President Nixon would not defeat a grand jury's right to have access to all
relevant evidence. As the en banc court noted:
Mhe President asserts that the tapes should be deemed privileged because
of the great public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of conversations
that take place in the President's performance of his official duties .... But we
think that this presumption of privileged premised on the public interest in
confidentiality must fail in the face of the uniquely powerful showing made by
the Special Prosecutor in this case. The function of the grand jury ... is not
only to indict persons when there is probable cause to believe they have com-
mitted crimes, but also to protect persons from prosecution when probable cause
does not exist [citing Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 687-88] .... The grandjury here is not engaged in a general flshin; expedition, nor does it seek in any
way to investigate the wisdom of the President's discharge of his discretionary
duties. On the contrary, the grand jury seeks evidence that may well be conclu-
sive to its decisions in on-going investigations that are entirely within the proper
scope of its authority.
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 717 (D.C. Cir, 1973).
4Shield laws- analogous to the attorney-client privilege-have been proposed in
both houses of Congress, see, e.g., the proposed amendment to the Free Flow of Informa-
tion Act, 119 CoNG. REc. I (daily ed. March 8, 1973).
Another bill, entitled the "Newsmen's Privilege Act of 1971," was introduced by
Rep. Charles V. Whalen, Jr. (R., Ohio). In pertinent part, H.R. 4271 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971) created a "privilege" for any person not to:
disclose any confidential information received or obtained by him in his capacity
as a reporter, editor, commentator, journalist, writer, correspondent, announcer,
or other person directly engaged in the gathering or presentation of news for
any newspaper, periodical, press association, newspaper syndicate, wire service,
or radio or television station.
The bill specifically applied to all proceedings before federal courts, grand juries, federal
agencies, departments, commissions, and to congressional committees. Sen. James B. Pear-
son (R., Kansas) introduced an identical bill on March 23, 1971, S. 1311, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) Mr. Justice White, in Branzburg v. Hayes, noted this congressional ac-
tivity. 408 U.S. at 689 n.28.
Similarly the Court noted that 17 states have provided some type of statutory
privilege. 408 U.S. at 689 n.27. These state laws vary greatly in the privilege granted
to withhold sources and information. For example, Indiana, Montana, Nevada, and
Pennsylvania laws protect print and electronic media from divulging the source of in-
formation obtained in the course of employment. Michigan and Ohio shield laws modify
the privilege, but limit it to communications between reporters of newspapers or other
publications and their informers. Other state shield laws circumscribe the privilege by
protecting the source of information actually published or broadcast. See generally
Comment, Branzburg v. Hayes: A Need for Statutory Protection of News Sources, 61 Ky.
L.J. 551, 556 n.27 (1973).
It is instructive to note that when the first shield law was enacted by Maryland in
1898, Professor John Henry Wigmore predicted that the statute, "as detestable in substance
as it is crude in form, will probably remain unique." 8 J. WIGsoeRE, EVIDENCE § 2285-86
(McNaughton rev. 1961).
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was expressed by the press.5 The press argued that the first amendment
protects the freedom to gather news as well as to print it.6 After Branz-
burg, the question became to what extent, if any, does the first amend-
ment protect the confidentiality of a reporter's source?
The Second Circuit answered this question by strictly limiting the
applicability of Branzburg to sources pertaining to criminal activity
under consideration by the grand jury. In Baker v. F. & F. Investment'
a unanimous panel affirmed a district court decision denying a motion
seeking to compel a journalist to reveal his confidential source during
an oral deposition.
The controversy in Baker stemmed from a class action brought
in the Northern District of Illinois on behalf of all blacks who had
acquired houses in the Chicago area between 1952 and 1969.8 The
complaint alleged violations of federal civil rights laws in that the de-
fendant real estate brokers had engaged in discriminatory practices
such as blockbusting. In the course of pre-trial discovery, one Alfred
5 See, e.g., Statement of Joel M. Gora and Victor S. Navasky, Hearings on H.R. 837,
1084, 15891, 15972, 16527, 16713, 16542 before Subcomm., No. 3 of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., Ser. 37 (1972). See also Nelson, The Newsmen's
Privilege Against Disclosure of Confidential Sources and Information, 25 VAND. L. Ray.
667 (1971), wherein the author, the Director of the School of Journalism at the University
of Wisconsin, lauded Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), as the first
case to deal with and validate the reporter's right to silence. The article was published
before Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), struck down the Caldwell decision. See
also Note, 46 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 617 (1971).
6 Supreme Court cases predating Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 US. 665 (1972), did not
deal with a reporter's right to gather news, but were limited to government and state
interferences with publication and distribution where the deleterious effect on the
proliferation of ideas was self-evident. See Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948)
(restraints on circulation and distribution voided); Bridges v. California, 314 US.
252 (1941) (restricting reporting of trial); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) (voiding a privilege tax on the selling of advertisements); Near v. Minnesota, 283
U.S. 697 (1931) (voiding a state law permitting prior restraint by injunction).
7470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973), discussed in Note,
Newsmen's Privilege: A Challenge to Branzburg, 53 B.U.L. Rv. 497 (1973).
8 Baker v. F.&F. Inv., 300 F. Supp. 310 (N.D. Ill. 1969), afl'd, 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.
1970) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint). The civil rights action, with
some 3500 class plaintiffs alleging discriminatory practices of the 60 named defendant
real estate brokers, was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) which provides that "[a]l1
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real
and personal property." The central allegation of the plaintiffs' complaint was
that some of the defendants engaged in what is popularly known as 'blockbusting',
that some of the defendants stimulated and preyed on racial bigotry and fear
by initiating and encouraging rumors that negroes were about to move into a
given area, that all non-negroes would leave, and that the market values of
properties would descend to 'panic prices' with residence in the area becoming
undesirable and unsafe for non-negroes.
300 F. Supp. 210, 214 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
The Illinois litigation is commented on in Note, Discriminatory Housing Markets,
Racial Unconscionability and Section 1988: The Contract Buyers League Case, 80 YALE
L.J. 516 (1971).
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Balk, the author of an expos6 on blockbusting in Chicago, was sub-
poenaed by the plaintiffs for the purpose of obtaining his oral deposi-
tion in New York City.9 At the examination before trial, Mr. Balk was
cooperative and expressed sympathy with the plantiffs' cause of action.
However, when questioned as to the identity of his source, Mr. Balk
refused to disclose the name of the Chicago real estate broker who had
revealed the practices of local blockbusters. He stated that the infor-
mation had been given to him under a promise of strict confidentiality
and that he was protected from compulsory disclosure by the first
amendment, whereupon the plaintiff sought an order in the Southern
District of New York requiring Mr. Balk to respond.'0 District Judge
Bonsal denied this motion and an interlocutory appeal" was taken to
the Second Circuit.
Although the appellants rejected the balancing approach 2 ap-
9 Mr. Balk had moved to New York City after publication of the expos6 on block-
busting. 339 F. Supp. 942 (1972). The article, "Confessions of a Blockbuster," in Saturday
Evening Post, July 14, 1962, caused widespread animosity. Mr. Balk reported receiving
many threatening telephone calls and letters; he changed his home telephone number to
an unlisted one, and finally obtained police protection for his home and family. Brief
for Appellee at 9.
At present, Mr. Balk is Editor of the Columbia journalism Review and a lecturer at
the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism. 470 F.2d 778, 780.
10 389 F. Supp. 942 (1972).
11 That this interlocutory appeal procedure is "unusual" was raised and disposed of
by the court of appeals:
Although neither party has questioned the appealability of this order, it is ap-
propriate that we state that ordinarily, orders denying or directing discovery
are non-appealable interlocutory decisions, see, e.g., Alexander v. United States,
201 U.S. 117, 26 S. Ct. 356, 50 L. Ed. 686 (1906); Borden Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d
843 (3d Cir. 1969); United States v. Fried, 886 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1967); cf.,
Republic Gear Company v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1967).
Special circumstances, however, attend motions for discovery made in a district
other than the district in which the main action is brought. Although an order
compelling disclosure in an "outside" jurisdiction is generally not reviewable,
see, e.g., National Nut Co. of California v. Kelling Nut Co., 134 F.2d 532 (7th
Cir. 1943); cf., Honig v. E.. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 404 F.2d 410 (5th Cir.
1968), an order denying disclosure in a jurisdiction beyond that of the main
proceeding is immediately reviewable, to give the party seeking discovery an effec-
tive remedy. Republic Gear Company v. Borg-Warner Corp., supra, 381 F.2d at
554. In that case Judge Waterman stated the underlying policy justification for
this rule as follows:
[E]ven if the appellate court in the jurisdiction in which discovery is
sought awaited a final decision in the main proceeding before acting at
all it would be necessary to return to the ancillary, appellate court to
argue the discovery issue. And if, upon appeal, the party were successful
in reversing the lower court's order and thus obtained discovery, he
would be required to go back to the court where the main case had al-
ready been tried, and there, with the discovered evidence now admissible
on the merits, move to retry the case. The impracticality of this cum-
bersome procedure compels us to grant immediate appellate review of an
order which, in another context, we might properly hold to have been
an interlocutory order.
Id. See also, 9 J. Mfooax, Favxa-A. PRAcricE g 110.13[2], at 157.
470 F.2d 778, 780 n.3.
12 Brief for Appellant at 13-14.
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pellees'3 claimed was delineated in Branzburg, they contended never-
theless that the public interest in the orderly administration of justice
outweighed the newsman's first amendment protections. 14 They noted
that Branzburg had rejected the existence of an absolute privilege in
constitutional terms and that no federal shield law had been enacted.15
Thus, the appellants argued that in cases of federal-question jurisdic-
tion, especially those involving civil rights actions, newsmen should be
required to disclose their confidential sources.16 Judge Kaufman found
no justification for picking and choosing among federal statutes and
rejected their position totally.1 7 The court acknowledged the eminence
of the first amendment in the "pantheon of freedoms"' 8 and posited
that at least in civil litigation there are instances where "the public
interest in non-disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources out-
weighs the public and private interest in compelled testimony. '19
Having enunciated these principles of law, Judge Kaufman pro-
ceeded to apply them to the case at bar. Since Mr. Balk was not a party
to the original action and there was no evidence that the available
channels of information had been exhausted, the court concluded that
appellants had failed to establish that the identity of Mr. Balk's source
went to the heart of their claim.20
Support for the court's decision was found in another Second Cir-
cuit case, Garland v. Torre.2 1 In Garland, an action for libel, the
18 Brief for Appellee at 25.
14 470 F.2d at 784-85.
15 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689 (1972). See notes 2-5 supra.
16 470 F.2d at 783. Arguing against the use of any balancing test in the first instance,
the appellants further argued that "[e]ven if such a balancing test were appropriate,
plaintiffs submit the overriding federal policy behind an effective guarantee of civil rights
far outweighs any state interest reflected in a statutory journalist's privilege." Brief for
Appellant at 21.
17 470 F.2d at 183.
18 Id.
19 ld.
20 Id. Judge Bonsal, in the court below, had grounded his determination on similar
analysis, and went so far as to suggest ways for the plaintiffs' to get the information with-
held from them by Mr. Balk:
The facts related in Mr. Balk's article and the pictures therein certainly provide
leads to the plaintiffs in obtaining discovery. Further relevant information could
be obtained by a search of the title records and the mortgage records in the
county in which plaintiffs claim the unlawful activities took place.
39 F. Supp. 942, 945.
That such "leads" could facilitate discovery was, however, bitterly disputed by the
plaintiffs:
The leads alluded to . . . indicate only that blockbusting took place in black-
white boundary areas in the West, South, and Southwest sides of Chicago.
Those sections cover all of the black-white boundary areas in Chicago, with
a population of 8,367,000, 32% of which is black.
Appellants Reply Brief at 10.
21259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958).
[Vol. 48:262
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Second Circuit upheld a lower court order citing a journalist for con-
tempt for refusing to reveal a confidential source. There, the identity
of the confidential source which had caused her to be defamed was
crucial to the plaintiff's case and she had independently endeavored to
discover the identity of the source. The Garland court held that the
right to a day in court is fundamental and outweighs a reporter's first
amendment protections.22
The appellants further contended that Branzburg was applicable
on the merits. Judge Kaufman skillfully dismissed this contention by
interpreting narrowly the mandate of Branzburg.23 The court empha-
sized that in Branzburg the public interest in the viability of the grand
jury necessitated the disclosure by the journalist, while in Baker, no
22 The Garland opinion was written by Mr. Justice Stewart, then a Sixth Circuit
Judge, sitting by designation on the Second Circuit. Garland, the first federal case to
consider (and deny) the right of a journalist to maintain a first amendment privilege
of confidentiality has been the Wellspring of comment and criticism. Changes wrought
since Garland may have weakened the vitality of that holding. In Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
US. 374 (1967), the Supreme Court indicated that an unfettered free press will be
favored, notwithstanding resultant harm to private litigants. Furthermore, Garland, a
diversity case, was decided befOre New York's shield law, N.Y. Civa RiGhTS LAW § 79-A
(McKinney 1971), was enacted, and New York case law had refused to recognize a
journalist's privilege. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mooney v. Sheriff of N.Y. County, 269
N.Y. 291, 199 N.E.2d 415 (1936).
The balancing test asserted in Garland has been widely cited. See generally Beaver,
The Newman's Code, the Claim of Privilege and Everyman's Right to Evidence, 40 Ome.
L. RVy. 243 (1968) (positing that it Would be unwise to grant any testimonial privilege to
journalists, as journalism ig an unpoliced, unlicensed profession); Guest & Sample, The
Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw, U.L. Iv. 18
(1969) (suggesting an absolute privilege in all but national sectirity cases, and noting that
when Miss Garland finally learned the journalist's source after he voluntarily came
forward, she lost the libel suit anyway); Note, The Newsman's Privilege. Government
Investigations, Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CAmiF. L. REv. 1188 (1970)
(suggesting that an absolute privilege might be appropriate in civil litigation, where the
newsman is guilty of no misconduct); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information,
71 COLUmn. L. Rav. 838 (1971) (preferring balancing test to any absolute privilege).
The disparate results in post-Garland cases are indicative of the inconsistency in
results as courts either used, or rejected, the Garland balancing test.
In Cervantes v. Time, Inc., 464 F.2d 986 (8th Cir, 1972), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 1125
(1973), the court, using a balancing of interest test refused to order the defendant to dis-
close confidential sources. Plaintiff, the mayor of St. Louis, argued that he needed dis-
closure to prove the requisite reckless disregard of the facts and malice to sustain his
libel action. See also Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 594 F.2d 774 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1968); Washington Post Co. v. Keogh, 365 F.2d 965
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1011 (1966).
In State v. Buchanatl, 250 Ore. 244, 436 P.2d 729, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 905 (1968),
the court refused to recognize any privilege, and upheld the contempt citation. To the
same result see State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 783 N.W. 2d 943 (1971); In re Goodfader's
Appeal, 45 Hawaii 317, 367 P.2d 472 (1961).
23 "Branzburg v. Hayes ... involving as it did the right of a journalist to withhold
disclosure of confidential sources from a grand jury investigating criminal activities, is
only of tangential importance to this ca-e." 470 F.2d at 784. The court further cited
Mr. Justice Powell's concurrence in Branzburg, set forth in part in note 3 supra.
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such interest was present.24 Recognizing the necessity for a case-by-case
approach, Judge Kaufman weighed the litigants' weakly asserted in-
terest with the
paramount public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggres-
sive and independent press capable of participating in robust,
unfettered debate over controversial matters, an interest which
has always been a principal concern of the First Amendment.2 5
He concluded that the appellants had failed to establish such a com-
pelling need as to override the precious rights embodied in the first
amendment.26
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, con-
cern over future encroachments on the freedom of the press has been
widespread.27 However, the Baker decision by the Second Circuit will
24 470 F.2d at 784. Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in United States
v. Bursey, 466 F.2d 1059 (1972), declined to apply the Branzburg holding to a situation
wherein the defendants appeared before a grand jury, but refused to divulge the names
of fellow journalists who worked on their Black Panther Party newsletter. The court
ruled that the question violated the defendants' rights to freely associate with others,
and had a chilling effect on freedom of the press, since the Government failed to show
how the questions related to the investigation of the grand jury. The court noted fir.
Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes. See note 3 supra.
25 470 F.2d at 782.
26 The Baker courts - both district and appellate - cited both federal case law and
state statutes to support their reasoning that a balancing test would be the proper way
to determine newsmen privilege cases. New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964), was cited as indicative of the federal interest in guaranteeing a robust press, 470
F.2d at 782, and the shield laws of New York and Illinois, the forum state of the
deposition and the underlying civil rights action, were cited, although the court was
careful to note that they were not conclusive on this action. Id.
The Illinois statute, ILL. Rav. STAT., ch. 51, § 11 et seq. (1971), sets forth a qualified
privilege, and embodies a balancing test:
The court, under the Illinois scheme, is directed to consider the nature of the
proceeding, and the possibility of getting the information through other means.
The court may order disclosure only if "all other available sources of information
have been exhausted and disclosure of the information sought is essential to the
protection of the public interest involved.
Id. § 117. The New York statute, N.Y. CivIl RiGHTs LAw § 79-H (McKinney 1971), pro-
vides in pertinent part:
[N]o professional journalist . . . shall be adjudged in contempt by any
court . . . for refusing or failing to disclose . . . the source of any such news
coming into his possession in the course of gathering or obtaining news for
publication . . . in a newspaper, magazine, or for broadcast by a radio or tele-
vision transmission station or network, by which he is professionally employed
or otherwise associated in a news gathering capacity.
For an analysis of the New York statute see People v. Wolf, 39 App. Div. 2d 864, 333
N.Y.S.2d 299 (1st Dep't 1972).
The appellants argued that the district court had erroneously considered the state
shield laws in reaching its decision. Appellant's Brief at 17. The appellate court rejected
this argument, stating that reference to state law was properly had to "inform [the]
judgment" of the court "concerning the appropriate federal public policy in the area of
a newsman's privilege." 470 F.2d at 781.
27 A difficult question was raised recently when District Judge Hoffman granted
authority to former Vice President Agnew's lawyers "to conduct their own investigation,
with full power of subpoena, into the alleged Justice Department leaks of information."
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serve to calm those fears by limiting access to a reporter's sources in
civil cases only to those whose disclosure goes to the heart of the under-
lying case and only in instances where independent effort to discover
the desired information has been made. Moreover, the clarity with
which Baker balanced the relevant interests will serve as an example
for the method of inquiry to be utilized in future litigation involving
the newsman's privilege.
JUSTICIABILITY OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER
Holtzman v. Schlesinger
The constitutionality of United States military activity in Indo-
china pursuant to executive mandate1 has been the subject of consider-
able discussion 2 and litigation in the federal courts.3 The extent of
N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 1973, at 1, col. 4. This action was precipitated by leaks of information
pertaining to the investigation of criminal activity allegedly attributed to Mr. Agnew.
Eight subpoenas were served on various news organizations and reporters in a search for
sources close to the investigation. N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1973, at 1, col. 6. Although the
probable controversy was eventually mooted when the Vice President resigned, very serious
questions were involved. In light of the Baker and Branzburg approach it is clear that a
prospective criminal defendant's interest in securing an impartial jury may well outweigh
the privilege accorded the media to protect their sources.
I Presidential war powers derive principally from article II, section 2 of the Constitu-
tion providing that "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy.. ." and the reservation of presidential war making power in the article I, section
8 grant to Congress of the power "to declare war." In the debate over whether Congress
should be granted the power to "make" or "declare" war, the framers desired to allow
some war making power to reside in the Executive, especially the power to repulse
sudden attacks without first consulting Congress. 2 REcoPos OF THE FEDmAL CONVENTION
OF 1789 at 318-19 (M. Farrand ed. 1911). See Van Alstyne, Congress, the President, and
the Power to Declare War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 5-8 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Berger, War-Making by the President, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 29 (1972); Moore
& Underwood, The Lawfulness of United States Assistance to the Republic of Viet Nam,
112 CONG. R.-c. 13232-33 (daily ed. June 22, 1966); Reveley, Presidential War-Making: Con-
stitutional Prerogative or Usurpation?, 55 VA. L. REv. 1243 (1969); Schwartz & McCormack,
The Justiciability of Legal Objections to the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46
TExAs L. REv. 1033 (1968); Van Alstyne, Congress, the President and the Power to Declare
War: A Requiem for Vietnam, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1972); 116 CONG. REc. 7117-23
(daily ed. May 13, 1970) (Yale Paper, Pt. 1); 116 CONG. REc. 759-93 (daily ed. May 21,
1970) (Yale Paper, Pt. 2); Note, Congress, The President, and the Power to Commit Forces
to Combat, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1771 (1968); (Special Issue) 50 B.U.L. REv. (1970).
3 Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (original jurisdiction); Holtzman v.
Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, rehearing en banc denied, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1973); Mitchell
v. Laird, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1973); DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146 (2d Cir. 1973);
Mattola v. Nixon, 464 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1972), rev'g 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970);
Sarnoff v. Connally, 457 F.2d 809 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 929 (1972);
Massachusetts v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 979 (1972); Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Pietsch v. President of the United States, 434 F.2d 861
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 920 (1971); Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302 (2d Cir.
1970); Velvel v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970);
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